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UNREASONABLE RESTRAINTS: ANTITRUST 
LAW AND THE NATIONAL RESIDENCY 
MATCHING PROGRAM 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The road to becoming a medical doctor (“MD”) in the United States is 
long and arduous.1 After four years of medical school, every new MD 
must spend between two and nine years training under the instruction of 
experienced physicians.2 These training programs, called “residencies,”3 
are distributed among graduating medical students through a program 
known as the National Residency Matching Program (“NRMP”).4  
Affectionately called “the match” by individuals involved in the 
program, the NRMP is a private, nonprofit corporation designed to 
provide “an impartial venue for matching applicants’ and programs’ 
preferences for each other consistently.”5 The NRMP attempts to facilitate 
the process through which medical students choose their residency 
programs by using preference sheets called “Rank Order Lists.”6 Each 
potential resident ranks the residency programs in which he or she desires 
to participate.7 Every hospital department administering a residency 
program does the same.8 The hospital departments and students turn in 
their lists, and a computer performing a mathematical algorithm “matches” 
potential residents to programs.9 Every year, the NRMP receives over 
30,000 student applications for approximately 23,000 available residency 
positions.10
 1. To become a physician, students must complete four years of training at an accredited 
medical school, as well as two to nine years of graduate medical training in the form of residencies and 
fellowships. See National Board of Medical Examiners, USMLE, at http://www.nbme.org/programs/ 
usmle.asp. 
 2. For data on the lengths of different residency programs, see infra notes 37–39 and 
accompanying text. 
 3. See infra notes 19–21 and accompanying text. 
 4. National Resident Matching Program Medical School User Guide, available at 
http://www.nrmp.org/res_match/tables/med_schl_off_2000.pdf (January 2004) [hereinafter User 
Guide], at 2. 
 5. Id. at 3. 
 6. Id.  
 7. Id.
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. at 2.  
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A major goal of the NRMP is elimination of confusion that could arise 
during the matching process if each residency program utilized its own 
procedure and timeline when filling resident positions.11 However, the 
match creates different problems. Every student who participates in 
NRMP agrees to “honor the match” and accept a residency at any program 
selected by the computer.12 This requirement results in new residents 
having virtually no power to bargain with their future employers over 
working hours or compensation.13  
Critics have long argued that the NRMP process is extremely difficult 
for young doctors, and that the long hours and little pay residents receive 
for their efforts borders on abuse.14 However, a group of residents has 
recently gone further, alleging that the NRMP matching program violates 
§ 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act.15 The Complaint, filed in the District 
Court for the District of Columbia on May 5, 2002, against major medical 
associations such as the AAMC, NRMP, and AMA, as well as prominant 
educational hospitals, alleges that the actions by the defendants in the 
“hiring, employment and compensation of resident physicians,” through 
the NRMP matching program, have the purpose and effect of depressing 
and stabilizing compensation and other terms of residents’ employment.16  
In a purely commercial setting, the NRMP’s policies would likely be 
condemned by a court using the relatively quick and very final per se rule, 
which traditionally held invalid any horizontal agreements among 
 11. See infra notes 22–26 and accompanying text. 
 12. NRMP: Residency Match, Match Participation Agreement for Applicants and Programs 
§ 5.1, available at http://www.nrmp.org/res_match/policies/map_main.html [hereinafter NRMP: 
Residency Match]. 
 13. See infra notes 180–87 and accompanying text. 
 14. See, e.g., Michael Romano, Preserving Quality of Education: Accreditation Council Limits 
Residents’ Work Week, MODERN HEALTHCARE, June 17, 2002, at 17 (stating that residents often work 
100 hours per week for an average of $36,000 per year, or less than $10 per hour, “less than the pay 
for many hospital maintenance workers”). In response to these criticisms there has been some attempt 
at internal reform. The Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical Education (“ACGME”) approved 
a policy in June 2000 limiting residents’ hours to eighty per week, averaged over one month. Id. 
However, the policy allows for extensions. Id. The only state to regulate residents’ work hours is New 
York, which has limited residents to eighty hours per week since 1989. Id. In November 2001, a 
similar bill was introduced into the United States Congress. Id. However, it faces serious opposition 
from hospital groups who are “eager to try to forestall attempts by Congress to pass broad legislation 
mandating a limit on resident work hours.” Id.  
 15. Complaint, Jung v. Ass’n of Am. Med. Coll. (D.C. D.C. 2002) (No. 1-02-00873) [hereinafter 
Complaint]. The Complaint also alleges that the numerous defendants have violated antitrust laws 
through acts of information exchange and the maintenance of anticompetitive accreditation standards. 
Complaint at 6.This Note addresses the legality of the NRMP matching program. Consideration of the 
other antitrust allegations is beyond the scope of this Note. 
 16. Id. at 5–6. 
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competitors to fix prices.17 However, due to the function of nonprofit and 
professional organizations in the marketplace, courts have been less 
certain of the breadth of analysis needed to invalidate restraints by these 
types of organizations.18 Using the NRMP program as an example, this 
Note examines the application of antitrust principles to the actions of 
nonprofit and professional organizations and concludes that courts should 
apply traditional antitrust analysis except in very limited circumstances. 
Part II will describe the NRMP program. Part III will discuss the goals of 
the Sherman Act. Part IV will outline the special role nonprofit 
organizations can play in the market. Part V will trace the course of 
Sherman Act jurisprudence with respect to nonprofit and professional 
organizations. Finally, Parts VI and VII will apply the case law to the 
NRMP and conclude that under traditional antitrust analysis, the NRMP 
program should be invalidated and replaced by a system of minimal 
regulation that promotes competition. 
II. THE NRMP PROCESS 
A. History of the Match 
The concept of the in-house “rounding-out,” or residency, for medical 
school graduates did not originate until World War I.19 Once the programs 
began, early residents actually lived at their respective hospitals while 
tending to patients and observing the techniques and practices of more 
respected physicians.20 By 1940, fourteen medical specialties21 offered 
board certification, meaning specialized residency programs existed in 
those areas.22 As the number of certified specialties continued to grow, so 
 17. See infra notes 86–89 and accompanying text. 
 18. See infra notes 104–62 and accompanying text. 
 19. KENNETH M. LUDMERER, TIME TO HEAL: AMERICAN MEDICAL EDUCATION FROM THE TURN 
OF THE CENTURY TO THE ERA OF MANAGED CARE 80 (1999). Before World War I, residency training 
programs did not exist. Id. at 79. Most educators believed four years of medical school provided 
sufficient training for the general practice of medicine. Id. However, in the 1920’s, the growing body 
of medical knowledge combined with rapid changes in technique became too much information to be 
learned in just four years. Id. at 80. 
 20. Id. Because they actually lived in the hospitals, early residents were known as “resident 
physicians” or “house staff,” From which the modern term “resident” arose. Id. at 80.  
 21. The fourteen subspecialties offering board certification in 1940 were ophthalmology, 
otolaryngology, obstetrics and gynecology, dermatology, pediatrics, orthopedic surgery, psychiatry 
and neurology, radiology, urology, internal medicine, pathology, anesthesiology, plastic surgery, and 
surgery. Id. at 88.  
 22. Id. For a general history of the rise of specialization in medicine, see U.S. Department of 
Health and Human Services, Health Resources and Services Administration, Graduate Medical 
Education and Public Policy: A Primer 2 (December 2000) [hereinafter GME Primer]. 
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did the demand for residency training.23 Although enough resident 
positions existed to meet the demand, medical students competed fiercely 
for placement in the more prestigious programs.24 Different hospitals 
appointed residents on different dates and often pressured students to enter 
into binding contracts before competing institutions released their 
appointments.25 To solve this problem, the Association of American 
Medical Colleges (the “AAMC”), the American Medical Association 
(“AMA”), and several hospitals instituted the National Intern Matching 
Plan in 1951-52.26 This system formed the basic rubric on which the 
current matching program has been built.27
After the match was adopted, teaching hospitals began using salary 
increases to lure the best residents away from competing programs.28 Price 
competition was especially fierce among schools in the same geographic 
area.29 Medical students and residents “reveled” in the competition.30 
However, many hospitals expressed a “gnawing fear” that resident salaries 
would continue to increase and never stop as long as the market was 
competitive.31
B. Scope of the Modern Matching Program 
The modern matching program, the NRMP, is larger, more complex, 
and more widespread than the original program.32 In 2000, over eighty 
percent of the available first-year residency positions in the United States 
 23. LUDMERER, supra note 19, at 88–90. 
 24. Id. at 93. 
 25. Id. This situation led to medical students being left with an unenviable choice: “to accept a 
position at a less desirable hospital, or to wait to hear from a more desirable hospital, risking the 
chance of ending up with no appointment at all.” Id. 
 26. Id. at 206. At first, the matching program was only used to match students with one year 
intern programs following medical school. As longer residencies became the norm, the match 
expanded to control those as well. Id. The early match worked in the same manner as the current 
program: both students and hospitals ranked their choices for programs and students, respectively. Id. 
On a certain date, the two lists were matched and the resulting appointments became binding on both 
parties. Id.  
 27. See supra notes 5–10 and accompanying text. 
 28. LUDMERER, supra note 19, at 192–93. By raising resident salaries, hospitals were essentially 
lowering the costs of an education for their students. Id. The fact that salaries continued to rise 
indicated the existence of a competitive market. Id. 
 29. LUDMERER, supra note 19, at 192–93. 
 30. Id.  
 31. Id. at 192.  
 32. The NRMP is now sponsored and run by five organizations: The American Board of Medical 
Specialties (“ABMS”), the American Medical Association (“AMA”), the Association of American 
Medical Colleges (“AAMC”), the American Hospital Association (“AHA”) and the Council of 
Medical Specialty Societies (“CMSS”). User Guide, supra note 4, at 2. 
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were offered exclusively through the NRMP.33 Hospitals whose programs 
participate in the NRMP must agree not to select residents in any other 
way.34 This situation has the effect of substantially limiting the residency 
programs available to students who choose to pursue graduate medical 
training outside of the match. Furthermore, students who choose to 
participate in the NRMP must accept a position where they are matched.35  
In addition to the large percentage of residency positions controlled 
exclusively by the NRMP, residents are left virtually optionless when 
deciding between programs administered through the match.36 Past 
average starting resident salaries for NRMP residencies varied as little as 
$1,000 between diverse specialties such as neurosurgery and internal 
medicine.37 Within specialty programs in the same geographic region, 
salaries were all within $4,000.38 Figures for other variables, such as 
average work hours and time on–call, were also very similar within 
specialties.39  
Although the NRMP was initially founded to control confusion in 
matching residents and programs, critics of the match have alleged that it 
is the cause of residents’ heavy workload and low pay and should be 
invalidated.40 The rest of this Note examines antitrust principles and 
applies them to the NRMP.  
III. PURPOSES OF THE SHERMAN ACT 
Courts and commentators generally agree that in passing the Sherman 
Antitrust Act,41 Congress sought to protect and promote competition in the 
marketplace.42 However, neither the Act’s plain language nor its 
 33. Complaint, supra note 15, at 23. The 2000 match placed approximately 20,000 applicants for 
residencies into 3,700 programs at 701 different hospitals. GME Primer, supra note 22, at 3. In 2003, 
31,004 applicants participated in the match, competing for 23,365 positions in 3,719 different 
programs. User Guide, supra note 4, at 2. 
 34. NRMP: Residency Match, supra note 12, § 1.0 (“Teaching hospitals that register any 
programs in the Matching Program agree to select senior students of U.S. allopathic medical schools 
for all of their programs only through the Matching Program. 
 35. Id. at § 5.1 
 36. See, e.g., AAMC, FREIDA Online Specialty Training Search, at http://www.ama-assn.org/ 
vapp/freida/spcindx/0,2654,TR,00.html. 
 37. See id. 
 38. Id.  
 39. See id. The average first-year resident in an internal medicine program makes $38,172.00 per 
year, and works on average 64.3 hours per week. 
 40. FREIDA Online Specialty Statistics Information, at http://www.ama-assn.org/vapp/freida/ 
spcstsc/0,1238,140,00.html. 
 41. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (1998). 
 42. See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ECONOMICS AND FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW 1 (1985) 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p245 Crall book pages.doc 4/12/2004  
 
 
 
 
 
250 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 82:245 
 
 
 
 
 
 
legislative history provides much guidance concerning the specific goals 
Congress wanted to address.43 Because of this, substantial disagreement 
exists as to exactly why competition should be protected.44
One influential view45 is that antitrust laws exist to enhance consumer 
welfare through the efficient allocation of resources.46 Judge Bork, the 
leading scholar supporting this school of thought, argues that “[t]he only 
legitimate goal of American antitrust law is the maximization of consumer 
welfare” through economic efficiency.47 Judge Bork asserts that the 
legislative history of the Sherman Act “displays the clear and exclusive 
policy intention of promoting consumer welfare.”48 Many economists and 
legal scholars share Judge Bork’s views as to the fundamental purpose of 
antitrust law.49
Other scholars argue that efficiency is not the only thing that “counts” 
when applying antitrust principles.50 These individuals believe that 
[hereinafter HOVENKAMP, ECONOMICS] (stating that “[a]n important goal—and perhaps the only 
goal—of antitrust law is to ensure that markets are competitive.”).  
 43. ROGER D. BLAIR & DAVID L. KASSERMAN, ANTITRUST ECONOMICS 53 (1985) (“The vague 
and general prohibition of trade restraints . . . in Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act has caused much 
mischief. Due to the lack of specificity, the Sherman Act was little more than a legislative command 
that the judiciary develop the law of antitrust.”). See also Terry Calvani, What is the Objective of 
Antitrust?, in ECONOMIC ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST LAW 7 (Terry Calvani & John Siegfried eds., 2d 
ed. 1988) (“[I]t is fair to say that the historical examination of the Sherman Act does not conclusively 
establish that Congress had a consistent particularized goal in mind when it enacted the legislation.”).  
 44. See Calvani, supra note 43, at 8 (“[A] veritable menu of possibilities” have been suggested as 
to the underlying rationale for federal antitrust laws). 
 45. ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 51 (1978). 
 46. Id. at 12. Properly functioning competitive markets are the most efficient because they 
maintain what is called marginal cost pricing. Id. Marginal cost is the cost increase resulting from 
producing one more unit of a product. Id. In a competitive market where no one firm (or combination 
of firms) is large enough to affect prices, each producer of goods is forced to sell at marginal cost. Id. 
If a given producer in a competitive market were to raise its price above marginal cost, it would face 
losing business to competitors who could undercut its price. Id. Pricing at marginal cost ensures that 
consumers pay no more for a product than it is actually worth to them and to society. BLAIR & 
KASSERMAN, supra note 43, at 21. If producers price goods above marginal costs—as often happens in 
the absence of competition—consumers pay more for goods than they are actually worth. Id. Some 
argue that this view is the most influential explanation of antitrust principles. See, e.g., Shrikanth 
Srinivasan, Note, College Financial Aid and Antitrust: Applying the Sherman Act to Collaborative 
Nonprofit Activity, 46 STAN. L. REV. 919, 926 (1994) (arguing that although the consumer welfare 
explanation of antitrust is not “universally accepted,” it is the “dominant” view). See also Calvani, 
supra note 43, at 12 (“Perhaps the most frequently cited antitrust objective is to achieve allocative or 
economic efficiency by preserving competition in the marketplace.”). 
 47. ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 51 (1978). 
 48. Id. at 61. Judge Bork cites to comments made by Senator Sherman during Senate arguments 
in which he expressed both concern for consumer welfare and an understanding of what effects higher 
prices could have on output and productivity. Id. at 62. 
 49. See Calvani, supra note 43, at 8 (arguing that “consumer welfare is the most appropriate 
frame of reference” in which to apply antitrust laws). See also (put some other things here later.) 
 50. See HOVENCAMP, ECONOMICS, supra note 42, at 41. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol82/iss1/5
p245 Crall book pages.doc 4/12/2004  
 
 
 
 
 
2004] UNREASONABLE RESTRAINTS 251 
 
 
 
 
 
 
efficiency must sometimes be sacrificed to protect alternative values.51 
Professor Fox contends, for example, that antitrust law should protect a 
variety of interests, such as wealth transfer, entrepreneurial opportunity, 
and preventing the spread of big business,52 sometimes at the expense of 
economic efficiency.53  
The vague language of the Sherman Act and its scant legislative 
history, combined with competing views over the underlying objectives of 
antitrust laws, puts courts in a difficult position. Courts must balance 
competing policy goals and understand the often complicated economic 
consequences of their possible actions.54 Decisions regarding activities of 
the nonprofit sector have been particularly inconsistent as courts struggle 
with the role nonprofit firms play in markets.55
IV. ROLE OF NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS IN THE MARKET 
Although the underlying premise of antitrust law is debatable, behind 
every theory is a shared belief that competition in a properly functioning 
market is the most effective means by which to achieve the desired policy 
objective.56 When achieved, a functioning, competitive market involves 
 51. Id. at 41–42. Professor Eleanor Fox, for example, argues that “neither Congress nor the 
Supreme Court envisioned sacrificing any one goal of antitrust for fuller realization of any other.” 
Eleanor M. Fox, The Modernization of Antitrust: A New Equilibrium, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 1140, 1142 
(1981). Unlike Judge Bork, Professor Fox sees the legislative history of the Sherman Act as indicative 
of the diverse conditions and concerns that prompted passage of the statute. Id. at 1147–48.  
 52. Id. at 1153–54. See also HOVENKAMP, ECONOMICS, supra note 42, at 41–42 (stating that the 
“competing values” at play in antitrust law include protection of small business, protection of ease of 
entry into business (or “entrepreneurship”), concern about the power of large companies, and 
encouragement of moral business practices); BLAIR & KASSERMAN, supra note 43, at 55 (explaining 
the view that multiple goals, such as prevention of wealth transfers and limiting the social and political 
power of large firms, should be seen as the goals of antitrust). 
 53. Fox, supra note 51, at 1142. Promoting alternative goals of antitrust can be harmful to 
efficiency when, for example, a large firm is broken up into several smaller ones. Sometimes, a large, 
integrated firm can more efficiently produce and deliver products to the market, thereby effectively 
lowering prices for consumers. Allowing the large firm to do business unimpeded would therefore 
promote consumer welfare through allocative efficiency. However, courts have found even these 
“good monopolies” violative of the Sherman Act based on the view that antitrust laws should protect 
small business and encourage entrepreneurship. See, e.g., United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 
F.2d 416, 428–29 (2d Cir. 1945) (finding a Sherman Act violation by a monopolist in large part 
because “great industrial consolidations are inherently undesirable, regardless of their economic 
results. . . . [I]t has been constantly assumed that one of [the antitrust statutes’] purposes was to 
perpetuate and preserve, for its own sake, and in spite of possible cost, an organization of small 
industry units . . . .”) (internal citations omitted). 
 54. See HOVENKAMP, ECONOMICS, supra note 42, at 42 (arguing that policymakers “must have a 
fairly good idea of what is being thrown into the scales” before attempting to balance competing 
policies regarding antitrust enforcement). 
 55. See infra Part IV. 
 56. See BORK, supra note 47, at 98 (stating that the “forces of competition in open markets” 
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multiple firms, allows for the entry of new businesses, and puts constant 
downward pressure on the price of goods.57 However, unregulated markets 
sometimes fail to function as they should due to situations that disrupt the 
competitive balance.58 These “market failures” cause inefficient allocation 
of resources and economic power and can reduce both business 
opportunities and consumer welfare.59
Market failures are often corrected by governmental regulation.60 
However, the existence and activities of nonprofit organizations may also 
act to correct two of the most common reasons for market failure: 
informational asymmetries and externalities.61 Because of their role in 
correcting market failure, the seemingly anticompetitive practices of 
nonprofit corporations arguably promote competition.62  
bring firms closer to the point of maximum efficiency and thus maximum social welfare); Fox, supra 
note 51, at 1154 (stating that “[t]he competition process is the preferred governor of markets. If the 
impersonal forces of competition . . . determine market behavior and outcomes, power is by definition 
dispersed, opportunities and incentives for firms without market power are increased, and the results 
are acceptable and fair.”). Courts have also endorsed the view that competition will most successfully 
achieve the many possible purposes of antitrust law. In Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. United States, 
the Court stated: 
The Sherman Act was designed to be a comprehensive charter of economic liberty aimed at 
preserving free and unfettered competition as the rule of trade. It rests on the premise that the 
unrestrained interaction of competitive forces will yield the best allocation of our economic 
resources, the lowest prices, the highest quality and the greatest material progress, while at 
the same time providing an environment conducive to the preservation of our democratic 
political and social institutions. But even were that premise open to question, the policy 
unequivocally laid down by the Act is competition.  
356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958). See also United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 397 (1927) 
(holding that “whatever difference of opinion there may be among economists as to the social and 
economic desirability of an unrestrained competitive system, it cannot be doubted that the Sherman 
Law and the judicial decisions interpreting it are based upon the assumption that the public interest is 
best protected from the evils of monopoly and price control by the maintenance of competition.”). 
 57. See BLAIR & KASSERMAN, supra note 43, at 22 (discussing how competitive markets are 
generally seen as those with a large number of small firms). 
 58. A “market failure” occurs when the pricing system in a given market fails to produce the 
quantity of the good that is most efficient for society. ROY J. RUFFIN & PAUL R. GREGORY, 
PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 706 (1983). 
 59. See, e.g., Peter James Kolovos, Note, Antitrust Law and Nonprofit Organizations: The Law 
School Accreditation Case, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 689, 697 (1996). 
 60. Id. Some examples of regulated industries are those for professional services such as law, 
medicine, dentistry, engineering, or aviation. Id. 
 61. See Marina Lao, Discrediting Accreditation?: Antitrust and Legal Education, 79 WASH. U. 
L.Q. 1035, 1083 (2001) (finding that accreditation of professional education could be seen as 
procompetitive because it closes the information deficit and corrects market imperfections); Henry B. 
Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835, 847–50 (1980) (suggesting that 
nonprofit organizations exist to correct the particular type of market failure that occurs when there is 
no way for consumers to be sure they are getting the quality of service they paid for).  
 62. See Kolovos, supra note 59, at 698, (arguing that facially anticompetitive practices by 
nonprofit companies are often actually procompetitive means of correcting information deficits and 
externalities, and that a special antitrust analysis should be used when evaluating the effects of 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol82/iss1/5
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Informational asymmetries arise when consumers of goods do not 
possess adequate knowledge with which to evaluate the quality of those 
goods.63 This asymmetry is often seen in markets for professional services 
such as medicine, law, or education, where the nature of the service 
provided is too complex for the ordinary consumer to adequately 
determine the actual value of what he or she purchases.64 Because the 
consumer lacks the necessary information concerning quality, he or she 
may settle for a service of suboptimal value, which is inefficient and thus 
harms consumer welfare.65  
Nonprofit organizations can correct market failure due to information 
asymmetries in two ways. First, because a nonprofit firm, by definition, 
cannot distribute net earnings to its members,66 the organization will have 
less of an incentive to deceive consumers by cutting corners and delivering 
poor quality goods.67 Second, many nonprofit organizations exist for the 
sole purpose of providing information to consumers concerning goods or 
services68 or setting quality standards by which every member of a 
restraints in nonprofit markets); Srinivasan, supra note 45, at 947–49 (proposing a new standard of 
antitrust analysis, the “market failure rule,” for use when analyzing the activities of nonprofit 
organizations). 
 63. See Hansmann, supra note 61, at 843–44, 862–63 (noting that in certain markets, “consumers 
may be incapable of accurately evaluating the goods promised or delivered,” resulting in situations 
where “the consumer entrust[s] to the producer a great deal of discretion that the consumer is in a poor 
position to police”). 
 64. See id. at 866 (finding that education is a “complex and subtle service” about which potential 
students or their parents may not feel confident making qualitative judgments); see also Lao, supra 
note 61, at 1081 (finding that there is an “information gap” between producers and consumers in the 
market for legal services, although it is not as large as the gap in technical fields such as medicine). 
For example, even a well-educated consumer would find it difficult to compare the quality of service 
provided by different surgeons, or to evaluate a surgeon’s performance after a procedure to make sure 
that he or she received optimal value. See generally id. 
 65. See id. at 1084. The theory is that if consumers are unable to ascertain the quality of a 
service, they will be unwilling to pay a higher price for high quality service because they cannot tell 
the difference anyway. Id. If consumers will not pay a higher price for quality, the producers will have 
no incentive to produce high quality services, resulting in a downward spiral of price and quality that 
ultimately harms consumers. Id. 
 66. See, e.g., Hansmann, supra note 61, at 538. By definition, all nonprofit organizations must be 
barred from distributing their net profits to individuals who exercise control over them. Id. That does 
not mean that a nonprofit corporation cannot earn a profit, only that it must devote those earnings 
entirely to the furtherance of the purpose of the organization. Id. Hansmann refers to this lack of 
membership profits as the “nondistribution constraint.” Id.  
 67. See id. at 847–48 (finding that a consumer who purchases goods or services in a market 
where he must rely on the producer for quality assurance can “trust” a nonprofit organization, because 
the nondistribution constraint removes incentives to cut corners). 
 68. Such as Consumers Union. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p245 Crall book pages.doc 4/12/2004  
 
 
 
 
 
254 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 82:245 
 
 
 
 
 
 
profession or industry must abide.69 These actions narrow the distance 
between the knowledge of the producer and that of the consumer,70 
thereby instilling consumer confidence in the market and allowing 
consumers to pay for quality.71  
Nonprofit organizations can also correct market failures caused by 
externalities. An externality occurs when the purchaser of a product or 
service does not receive the product’s full value.72 Nonprofit organizations 
correct externalities through regulation.73 For example, in the case of 
medical education, the accreditation committee, the American Council on 
Graduate Medical Education (“ACGME”), sets the number of years 
required to acquire certification in any given medical field.74 The lengths 
of residency programs are therefore fixed, regardless of whether the 
student, as a consumer of education, would rather purchase a shorter 
program.75 This fixed length ensures that future physicians choose a 
socially optimal level of education.76
 69. The most frequently cited example of this type of nonprofit is an accreditation or policing 
organization for a profession, such as the American Bar Association or the American College of 
Obstetricians and Gynecologist. 
 70. Nonprofit groups that set professional standards lower informational asymmetries by 
providing consumers with a base level of quality assurance. See Lao, supra note 61, at 1079–82; see 
also Hansmann, supra note 61, at 862–63 (arguing that the nondistribution constraint places 
restrictions on the producer’s conduct “beyond those that [the consumer] is able to impose,” thus 
providing the consumer with additional protection). 
 71. See id; see also Kolovos, supra note 59, at 699. 
 72. See, e.g., WALTER NICHOLSON, MICROECONOMIC THEORY 568 (2d ed. 1978). In economic 
terms, an externality is defined as a situation in which “interactions among firms and individuals . . . 
are not adequately reflected in market prices.” Id. Externalities can occur when the benefits of an 
interaction are externalized. Id. For example, in the market for graduate medical education, it could be 
argued that a medical student who “purchases” a residency program does not receive the total value of 
the education. Some of the value passes to other consumers who benefit from competent, well-trained 
physicians. Because the student does not receive the total value of her education, she will be unwilling 
to pay more for it than the portion of the value she receives, thus undervaluing educational quality. In 
the end, this results in fewer well trained doctors than is socially optimal.  
 Externalities also occur when some of the costs of a transaction are not internalized. Nicholson, 
supra note 72, at 568. The classic example of a cost not being internalized is pollution. NICHOLSON, 
supra, at 568. Part of the cost of producing utilities is pollution. Id. at 569. However, the costs of 
pollution are imposed, at least in part, on the public. Id. at 569. 
 For other examples of market failure due to externalities see Lao, supra note 61, at 1085–86 
(explaining externalities in terms of law school education), and Kolovos, supra note 59, at 701 
(explaining externalities in the field of engineering). 
 73. See generally NICHOLSON, supra note 72, at 651. Externalities can also be corrected through 
government regulation, such as in the environmental context, or through private bargaining by the 
affected parties.Id. at 644–51. 
 74. See National Board of Medical Examiners, supra note 1. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
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The roles played by nonprofit and professional organizations in the 
market affect the way courts apply antitrust laws to trade restraints 
practiced by these types of groups.77 The next section will explore antitrust 
jurisprudence with respect to nonprofit and professional organizations. 
V. APPLICATION OF THE SHERMAN ACT TO NONPROFIT AND 
PROFESSIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 
A. Structure of Sherman Act Analysis 
Section 1 of the Sherman Act78 prohibits “[e]very contract, 
combination . . . or conspiracy, in restraint of trade.”79 If taken literally, 
this broad language would prohibit almost every contract.80 Since the 
passage of the statute, courts have had to develop a framework for 
analyzing exactly which contracts and conspiracies should be declared 
illegal as anticompetitive.81 At all times, they have attempted to balance 
the goals of antitrust regulation.82 The Supreme Court held early on that 
for a contract or conspiracy to violate § 1 of the Sherman Act, it had to 
unreasonably restrain trade.83
Modern courts analyze every antitrust case under one of three 
frameworks: the per se rule, the rule of reason, or the modified rule of 
reason, or “quick look.”84 Under each, the basic inquiry is whether the 
 77. See infra notes 104–63 and accompanying text. 
 78. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1998). 
 79. Id.  
 80. See Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 687–88 (1978) (“[R]estraint 
is the very essence of every contract; read literally, § 1 would outlaw the entire body of private 
contract law.”); United States v. Topco Assocs, Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 606 (1972) (“Were § 1 to be read 
in the narrowest possible way, any commercial contract could be deemed to violate it.”); see also Bd. 
of Trade of City of Chicago v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918) (“Every agreement concerning 
trade, every regulation of trade, restrains. To bind, to restrain, is of their very essence.”); see generally 
Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911); United States v. Joint Traffic Ass’n, 171 U.S. 
505 (1898).  
 81. See supra notes 41–55 and accompanying text. 
 82. See supra notes 41–55 and accompanying text. 
 83. In Standard Oil, Chief Justice White, after analyzing § 1 of the Sherman Act, stated: 
The statute under this view evidenced the intent not to restrain the right to make and enforce 
contracts, whether resulting from combinations or otherwise, which did not unduly restrain 
interstate or foreign commerce, but to protect that commerce from being restrained by 
methods, whether old or new, which would constitute an interference that is an undue 
restraint.  
221 U.S. at 60 (emphasis added). 
 84. See United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 668 (3d Cir. 1993) (finding three “general 
standards” for analyzing whether a proposed restraint is unreasonable under the Sherman Act). 
Although endorsing the three categories of antitrust analysis, the Supreme Court has stated that 
antitrust analysis should be “less fixed” than the categories would have it appear, and that the three 
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proposed restraint is unreasonable and therefore unlawful.85 This section 
will explain each of these frameworks and explore how they have been 
applied by courts to the activities of nonprofit organizations. 
The per se rule holds any practice that has been found to be plainly 
anticompetitive, with no procompetitive effects, presumptively 
unreasonable and invalid without an inquiry into the particular 
circumstances surrounding the restraint.86 Horizontal restraints87 such as 
price-fixing, territorial allocation, and to some extent, information 
exchange, all fall into this category.88 Due to their “pernicious effect on 
competition and lack of any redeeming virtue,” these types of restraints are 
categorically condemned—no market analysis is needed.89
In the majority of cases in which the alleged restraint is not so 
manifestly anticompetitive that it can be quickly condemned per se, courts 
tests should be seen as a continuum on which individual restraints are placed and analyzed. See Cal. 
Dental Ass'n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 779 (1999); see, e.g., Julie L. Seitz, Note, Consideration of 
Noneconomic Procompetitive Justifications in the MIT Antitrust Case, 44 EMORY L.J. 395, 408 
(1995); Theodore J. Stachtiaris, Antitrust in Need: Undergraduate Financial Aid and United States v. 
Brown University, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 1745, 1750 (1994). While realizing that bright lines do not 
separate the three categories of analysis, this Note will analyze the challenged activity of the NRMP 
each one of the three categories, as this is the type of analysis a district court hearing the case will 
likely undertake.  
 85. See infra notes 86–103 and accompanying text. 
 86. See Prof’l Eng’rs, 435 U.S. at 692 (stating that there “are agreements whose nature and 
necessary effect are so plainly anticompetitive that no elaborate study of the industry is needed to 
establish their illegality–they are ‘illegal per se.’”); Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. at 607 (“[C]ertain 
business relationships are per se violations of the Act without regard to a consideration of their 
reasonableness.”). 
 87. A horizontal restraint is one made through an agreement between competitors at the same 
level of the market, such as an agreement among manufacturers. See generally Nicholsan, supra note 
72. In comparison, vertical restraints are those made pursuant to an agreement between businesses at 
different levels, such as a manufacturer and a retailer. See HOVENKAMP, ECONOMICS, supra note 42, at 
8. 
 88. See Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. at 608 (territorial restraints are per se violations of Sherman 
Act); Fashion Originators' Guild of Am. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 468 (1941) (group boycotts are a per se 
violation); United States v. Socony–Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223 (1940) (finding horizontal 
price-fixing per se illegal).  
 89. N. Pac. Ry. Co., 356 U.S. at 5. Justice Black justified the stark results of the per se rule by 
stating: 
This principle of per se unreasonableness not only makes the type of restraints which are 
proscribed by the Sherman Act more certain to the benefit of everyone concerned, but it also 
avoids the necessity for an incredibly complicated and prolonged economic investigation into 
the entire history of the industry involved, as well as related industries, in an effort to 
determine at large whether a particular restraint has been unreasonable—an inquiry so often 
wholly fruitless when undertaken.  
 Id.  
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use the rule of reason.90 First announced in Chicago Board of Trade v. 
United States,91 the rule of reason looks at “whether the restraint imposed 
is such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or 
whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition.”92  
In order to determine the legality of a restraint on trade under the rule 
of reason, courts first require a plaintiff to prove that the activity in 
question restrains trade or has anticompetitive effects.93 If the plaintiff 
meets that burden, courts undertake a complicated analysis of the relevant 
market in order to assess the restraint in terms of its possible 
procompetitive effects.94 If the court finds that the restraint has a net 
procompetitive effect, it will survive antitrust scrutiny.95 However, if the 
anticompetitive effects outweigh any proffered procompetitive 
justifications, or if the justifications can be achieved through measures 
which do not stifle competition, the activity will be in violation of the 
Sherman Act.96
In between the per se rule and the rule of reason is a hybrid analysis 
often called the “quick look” or truncated rule of reason.97 A relatively 
recent development,98 the quick look test is applied when the restraint 
 90. See Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49 (1977) (“Since the early years of 
this century a judicial gloss on this statutory language has established the ‘rule of reason’ as the 
prevailing standard of analysis.”). 
 91. 246 U.S. 231 (1918). 
 92. Id. at 238.  
 93. See id.; see also Brown University, 5 F.3d at 668 (“The plaintiff bears an initial burden under 
the rule of reason of showing that the alleged combination or agreement produced adverse, anti-
competitive effects within the relevant product and geographic markets.”). 
 94. A classic statement of the relevant factors examined when looking at the procompetitive 
effects of a restraint under the rule of reason, often included in jury instructions, was given in Chicago 
Board of Trade by Justice Brandeis:  
To determine that question the court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the 
business to which the restraint is applied; its condition before and after the restraint was 
imposed; the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or probable. The history of the 
restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting the particular remedy, the purpose 
or end sought to be attained, are all relevant facts. This is not because a good intention will 
save an otherwise objectionable regulation or the reverse; but because knowledge of intent 
may help the court to interpret facts and to predict consequences.  
246 U.S. at 238. 
 95. See Brown University, 5 F.3d at 669 (“If a plaintiff meets his initial burden of adducing 
adequate evidence of market power or actual anti-competitive effects, the burden shifts to the 
defendant to show that the challenged conduct promotes a sufficiently pro-competitive objective.”). 
 96. Id.  
 97. See California Dental, 526 U.S. at 770. 
 98. The Supreme Court is said to have created the “quick look” in NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of 
Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 109–10 & n.39 (1984), when the court quoted leading antitrust scholar 
Phillip Areeda, who stated that “[t]he essential point is that the rule of reason can sometimes be 
applied in the twinkling of an eye.” Id. The court went on to state that the faster analysis allows the 
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being scrutinized does not necessarily fall into a per se category, but has 
plain and obvious anticompetitive effects.99 First, the activity is presumed 
unreasonable. This differs from the rule of reason in that under that test the 
plaintiff has the burden of proving anticompetitive effects; they are not 
presumed. The defendant has the opportunity to rebut the presumption of 
unreasonableness by presenting evidence of legitimate justifications or 
procompetitive effects.100 If the court finds the alleged justifications 
inadequate, or if it finds that the justifications can be served through less 
restrictive means, it will condemn the practice.101 However, if the 
justifications are plausible and questions remain, the court will undertake a 
full rule of reason analysis.102 Nonprofit and professional organizations 
have been analyzed under each type of antitrust analysis.103
B. Early Cases 
Early case law suggested that the activities of nonprofit organizations 
might be immune from antitrust scrutiny.104 However, in the 1975 decision 
Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar,105 the Supreme Court put that idea to rest 
by holding a county bar association that fixed minimum prices for legal 
services subject to § 1 of the Sherman Act.106 The Supreme Court found 
condemnation of a “naked restraint” on price or output without an “elaborate industry analysis.” Id. at 
110. However, the Supreme Court did not officially recognize the term “quick look” until its decision 
in California Dental, where it recognized and approved of lower courts’ use of the analysis generally, 
but rejected it in the particular case. See infra notes 152–60 and accompanying text for a discussion of 
the California Dental decision. 
 99. See California Dental, 526 U.S at 770 (explaining that the quick look is applied when “an 
observer with even a rudimentary understanding of economics could conclude that the arrangements in 
question would have an anticompetitive effect on customers and markets.”); NCAA, 468 U.S. at 106. 
 100. See California Dental, 526 U.S. at 771.  
 101. See Chicago Prof’l Sports Ltd. P’ship v. NBA, 961 F.2d 667, 674–76 (7th Cir. 1992) (finding 
the quick look analysis adequate after assessing and rejecting proffered procompetitive justifications). 
 102. See, e.g., California Dental, 526 U.S. 756; Brown University, 5 F.3d at 677–78 (requiring full 
rule –of reason analysis where universities colluded to provide financial aid to needy students). 
 103. See supra notes 104–62 and accompanying text. 
 104. In Marjorie Webster Jr. Coll., Inc. v. Middle States Ass'n of Colls. & Secondary Sch., Inc., 
432 F.2d 650 (D.C. Cir. 1970), the court found:  
[T]he proscriptions of the Sherman Act were “tailored . . . for the business world,” not for the 
noncommercial aspects of the liberal arts and the learned professions. In these contexts, an 
incidental restraint of trade, absent an intent or purpose to affect the commercial aspects of 
the profession, is not sufficient to warrant application of the antitrust laws.  
Id. at 654 (quoting F. R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961)). 
The court concluded that the defendant’s accreditation scheme was not intended to affect commerce, 
and thus the Sherman Act did not apply. Id. at 654–55. 
 105. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).  
 106. Id. at 787–88. In Goldfarb, the defendant state bar association argued that its “minimum fee 
schedule” could not be invalidated under antitrust law because “Congress never intended to include the 
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that “[t]he nature of an occupation, standing alone, does not provide 
sanctuary from the Sherman Act.”107 The Court did acknowledge, in a 
footnote, that antitrust analysis of the activities of a nonprofit organization 
might take the nature of the organization into account.108 However, the 
Court held that the county bar’s activities in this instance constituted 
“price-fixing,” and were per se unreasonable, even though the minimum 
fee schedule was merely advisory.109
Following Goldfarb, the Court was not shy in its application of § 1 of 
the Sherman Act to the activities of professional or nonprofit 
associations.110 However, it seemed reluctant to condemn the practices of 
nonprofit organizations using the per se rule.111  
In National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States,112 the 
Court employed a “quick look” analysis in holding that a professional 
engineering society’s prohibition on competitive bidding by its members 
was a violation of the Sherman Act.113  
learned professions within the terms ‘trade or commerce’ in § 1 of the Sherman Act.” Id. at 786. 
 107. Id. at 787 (citing Assoc. Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 7 (1945)). The Court reasoned 
that the Sherman Act contained no express exemption for nonprofit organizations, and that because 
“Congress intended to strike as broadly as it could” in section 1, to read in an exemption would not be 
consistent with the purposes of the Act. Id.  
 108. Id. at 788–89 n.17. The Court stated:  
The fact that a restraint operates upon a profession as distinguished from a business is, of 
course, relevant in determining whether that particular restraint violates the Sherman Act. It 
would be unrealistic to view the practice of professions as interchangeable with other 
business activities, and automatically to apply to the professions antitrust concepts which 
originated in other areas. The public service aspect, and other features of the professions, may 
require that a particular practice, which could properly be viewed as a violation of the 
Sherman Act in another context, be treated differently. We intimate no view on any other 
situation than the one with which we are confronted today.  
Id.  
 109. Id. at 783 (“On this record respondents’ activities constitute a classic illustration of price 
fixing.”). 
 110. See supra notes 112–63 and accompanying text. 
 111. See FTC v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 458 (1986) (“[W]e have been slow to 
condemn rules adopted by professional organizations as unreasonable per se . . . .”). However, the 
Court has, on occasion, found agreements between nonprofit organizations to be per se violations of 
the Sherman Act. CITE These cases most often involve a naked agreement between members of 
nonprofit or professional organizations to fix prices. See, e.g., FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers 
Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411 (1989) (finding a per se violation when a group of trial lawyers boycotted their 
public practices to obtain higher salaries’); see also Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 
332, 345–46 (1982) (holding that an agreement among doctors in a medical association to fix the 
maximum fees to be charged for service is a per se violation of the Sherman Act). 
 112. 435 U.S. 679 (1978). 
 113. Id. at 696–97. The engineering society attempted to justify the ban on price bidding as a 
necessary check on price fluctuations that could lead to public safety hazards. Id. at 693. The Society 
argued that the restraint was justified “because bidding on engineering services is inherently imprecise, 
would lead to deceptively low bids, and would thereby tempt individual engineers to do inferior work 
with consequent risk to public safety and health.” Id.  
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Because the restraint was not plainly price-fixing, the Court refused to 
apply the per se rule.114 Nonetheless, the Court found that “no elaborate 
industry analysis is required to demonstrate the anticompetitive character 
of such an agreement.”115 The Court then refused to accept as justifications 
any of the public health and safety concerns the engineering society 
offered.116 Rejecting the argument that competition in an industry could 
actually make things worse as “nothing less than a frontal assault on the 
basic policy of the Sherman Act,” the Court made a broad statement that 
the rule of reason does not entertain social welfare justifications for a 
restraint,117 even in the case of nonprofit organizations.118  
In Professional Engineers, the Court acknowledged its language in 
Goldfarb concerning the nature of antitrust scrutiny of nonprofit 
associations, but downplayed its significance.119 In NCAA v. Board of 
 114. Id. at 692. 
 115. Id.  
 116. Id. at 694. The court stated that while the society’s concern for public safety “might be 
reasonable . . . these are not reasons that satisfy the Rule.” Id. 
 117. Id. at 695.  
Exceptions to the Sherman Act for potentially dangerous goods and services would be 
tantamount to a repeal of the statute. In our complex economy the number of items that may 
cause serious harm is almost endless—automobiles, drugs, foods, aircraft components, heavy 
equipment, and countless others, cause serious harm to individuals or to the public at large if 
defectively made. The judiciary cannot indirectly protect the public against this harm by 
conferring monopoly privileges on the manufacturers.  
Id. at 595–96. 
 118. See id. at 695. The Court made clear that under the rule of reason, only a restraint that may 
promote competition is justified; those that promote welfare at the expense of competition are not. See 
id. at 695.  
The assumption that competition is the best method of allocating resources in a free market 
recognizes that all elements of a bargain—quality, service, safety, and durability—and not 
just the immediate cost, are favorably affected by the free opportunity to select among 
alternative offers. Even assuming occasional exceptions to the presumed consequences of 
competition, the statutory policy precludes inquiry into the question whether competition is 
good or bad. 
Id. at 695. 
 119. See id. at 696. 
[T]he cautionary footnote in Goldfarb cannot be read as fashioning a broad exemption under 
the Rule of Reason for learned professions. We adhere to the view expressed in Goldfarb that, 
by their nature, professional services may differ significantly from other business services, 
and, accordingly, the nature of the competition in such services may vary. Ethical norms may 
serve to regulate and promote this competition, and thus fall within the Rule of Reason. But 
the Society's argument in this case is a far cry from such a position. We are faced with a 
contention that a total ban on competitive bidding is necessary because otherwise engineers 
will be tempted to submit deceptively low bids. Certainly, the problem of professional 
deception is a proper subject of an ethical canon. But, once again, the equation of competition 
with deception, like the similar equation with safety hazards, is simply too broad; we may 
assume that competition is not entirely conducive to ethical behavior, but that is not a reason, 
cognizable under the Sherman Act, for doing away with competition. 
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Regents of the University of Oklahoma,120 the Court again invalidated the 
practice of a nonprofit organization using a “quick look” analysis.121 
Reiterating its finding in Professional Engineers that “as a matter of law, 
the absence of proof of market power does not justify a naked restraint on 
price or output,” the Court turned directly to the television plan’s possible 
procompetitive effects122 without first finding that the defendant possessed 
market power in the relevant market.123  
The Court first found that the NCAA’s principal justification for the 
restraint—protecting live attendance at football games—was “a 
justification that is inconsistent with the basic policy of the Sherman Act,” 
since it attempted to insulate live football from the effects of 
competition.124 It then dismissed the NCAA’s claim that the television 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 120. 468 U.S. 85 (1984). 
 121. Id. The defendants in NCAA maintained a “plan” for televising all NCAA college football 
games that “limit[ed] the total amount of televised intercollegiate football and the number of games 
that any one [football] team [could] televise.” Id. at 94. The Court recognized that such a restriction of 
output could be invalidated using the per se rule. Id. at 100 (“Horizontal . . . output limitation [is] 
ordinarily condemned as a matter or law under an ‘illegal per se’ approach”). However, it declined to 
do so because the industry was one in which “horizontal restraints . . . are essential if the product is to 
be available at all.” Id. at 101. The Court explained that the NCAA performed a necessary function by 
promulgating rules and marketing college football, without which no league sport could operate.Id. at 
101–02. However, the Court expressly denied treating the NCAA’s activities differently due to its 
status as a nonprofit association. Id. at 100. 
 122. Id. at 116–20. The NCAA contended that its television plan protected live attendance at 
football games by limiting the number of televised games, and helped to maintain a competitive 
balance among college athletic teams by ensuring that any one team did not receive a disproportionate 
share of revenue from television. Id. It also asserted that its television plan constituted a “cooperative 
joint venture,” by allowing the sale of many television rights at fixed prices to television networks, 
thereby cutting down on transaction costs. Id. at 113. For this argument the NCAA relied on the 
Court’s decision in Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979), which held 
that BMI’s fixed-price blanket licenses of its members’ music were, in essence, new products that 
allowed buyers of music to eliminate the costs associated with contracting individually with every 
artist, and thus had a net procompetitive effect under the rule of reason. Id. at 19–25. The NCAA Court 
distinguished BMI, finding that the NCAA’s television plan did not enhance efficiency because it did 
not end the practice of individual schools contracting with networks, and because the “package” 
product did not increase the total number of televised games. NCAA, 468 U.S. at 113–14.  
 123. NCAA, 468 U.S. at 109. Under the rule of reason, a plaintiff must first prove that a 
defendant’s alleged restraint of trade has anticompetitive effects. See supra notes 98–101 and 
accompanying text. Because anticompetitive effects in a particular industry can be difficult to assess, 
courts typically allow a showing of market power as a “surrogate” for showing anticompetitive 
effects.” HOVENKAMP, ECONOMICS, supra note 42, at 56–58. Market power is typically defined as the 
ability to raise or control prices in the relevant market. Id.  
 The Court’s finding of anticompetitive effects without a showing of market power in this case is 
generally seen by scholars as the first true application of the “quick look” analysis, although the court 
did not explicitly state that it used a truncated analysis in this case until its decision in California 
Dental. See infra notes 152–60 and accompanying text. 
 124. NCAA, 468 U.S. at 117. The Court reiterated its finding in Professional Engineers that “the 
Rule of Reason does not support a defense based on the assumption that competition itself is 
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plan actually helped maintain college football’s competitive balance.125 
Seeing no legitimate justifications for the NCAA’s actions, the Supreme 
Court affirmed the lower court’s judgments condemning the practice.126  
In a final early case, FTC v. Indiana Federation of Dentists,127 the 
Court used the “quick look” to determine that a dental association’s refusal 
to submit x-rays to dental insurers128 for use in determining coverage 
constituted a violation of the Sherman Act.129 The Federation asserted, 
inter alia, that their “concerted refusal to deal” was lawful because the 
Federal Trade Commission had not offered empirical evidence that the 
boycott raised the prices of dental care130 and the submission of x-rays 
alone to dental insurers could lead to a drop in the quality of dental care 
for consumers.131
The Court applied the rule of reason to the Federation’s behavior, but 
again did not conduct a market analysis.132 Stating that “application of the 
Rule of Reason to these facts is not a matter of any great difficulty,”133 the 
Court characterized the dentists’ behavior as plainly anticompetitive and 
went straight to the proffered justifications.134 The Court found, as it did in 
Professional Engineers, that noncompetitive “quality of care” 
justifications do not belong in antitrust analysis, as they essentially assert 
unreasonable.” Id.  
 125. Id. at 119–20. The Court accepted NCAA’s contention that maintaining the competitive 
balance in intercollegiate football, “a revered tradition of amateurism,” is a legitimate procompetitive 
interest. Id. at 120. However, the Court found that limiting the amount of revenue teams receive from 
televised football games “is not even arguably tailored to serve such an interest.” Id. at 119.  
 126. Id. at 120. 
 127. 476 U.S. 447 (1986). 
 128. Id. at 449–50. The dentists in Indiana Federation collectively refused to send patient x-rays 
to insurers, dental consultants would give recommendations concerning whether a claim for payment 
should be accepted. Id.  
 129. Id. at 465–66. The defendants’ conduct was found to violate section 5 of the FTC Act, which, 
in the antitrust context, is governed by the substantive law of section 1 of the Sherman Act. Id. at 454–
55.  
 130. Id. at 461 (“[T]he Federation . . . argues that a [finding of] unreasonable restraint of trade is 
precluded by the Commission’s failure to make any finding that the policy resulted in the provision of 
dental services that were more costly . . . .”). 
 131. Id. at 462–63. The Federation argued that claim assessors looking at x–rays in a vacuum 
would make inadequate judgments about appropriate treatment. Id. These judgments could lead to 
erroneous claim denial and degradation in the quality of care consumers received from their dentists. 
Id.  
 132. Id. at 461. 
 133. Id. at 459. 
 134. Id. at 461. It found that empirical proof of higher prices “is not an essential step in 
establishing that the dentists’ [behavior] was an unreasonable restraint of trade.” Id. This finding 
allowed the FTC to infer anticompetitive effects from the nature of the dentists’ concerted refusal to 
deal. Id. at 463–64. 
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that an unrestrained market will lead consumers to dangerous choices.135 
Finding no valid procompetitive justifications for the dentists’ refusal to 
deal with insurers, the Court held the Federation in violation of the 
Sherman Act.136  
C. Recent Doctrinal Shifts 
Decisions in cases such as Professional Engineers, NCAA, and Indiana 
Federation seemed to indicate that non economic factors could never 
justify agreements to fix price or reduce output.137 However, in two recent 
cases, United States v. Brown University138 and California Federation of 
Dentists v. FTC,139 the Third Circuit and then the Supreme Court, 
respectively, signaled a willingness to broaden the category of acceptable 
justifications for horizontal restraints when nonprofit organizations are 
involved, at least in certain circumstances.140  
In Brown University, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held 
that an agreement among nine universities, the “Ivy Overlap Group,” to fix 
financial aid awards141 could not be invalidated using the per se rule or the 
“quick look” even though horizontal price fixing was involved.142 After 
finding that the “Overlap Agreement” was plainly anticompetitive,143 the 
district court, relying on Supreme Court decisions such as Professional 
 135. Id. at 463. 
 136. Id. at 466. 
 137. See supra notes 120–36 and accompanying text. See also Frances H. Miller & Thomas L. 
Greaney, The National Resident Matching Program and Antitrust Law, 289 JAMA 913, 915 (2003) 
(stating that the “core principle” arising out of cases such as Professional Engineers “is that under the 
rule of reason, only improvements in competitive conditions will count on the defendants’ side of the 
ledger.”). 
 138. 5 F.3d 658 (3d Cir. 1993). 
 139. 526 U.S. 756 (1999). 
 140. See supra notes 138–39 and accompanying text. Neither court explicitly sanctioned trade-
restraining activities by nonprofit organizations, but the cases were remanded for full rule of reason 
analysis and consideration of noneconomic procompetitive justifications. Id. 
 141. Brown University, 5 F.3d at 662–63. The agreement in question, called the “Overlap 
Agreement,” had been investigated by the Department of Justice after several newspaper articles 
suggested that prestigious schools conspired when dispensing awards. See, e.g., Gary Putka, Do 
Colleges Collude on Financial Aid?, WALL ST. J., May 2, 1989, at B1. The investigation eventually 
implicated fifty-five different schools and spawned the Brown University lawsuit as well as several 
private actions. See, e.g., Kingsepp v. Wesleyan Univ., 763 F. Supp. 22 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). 
 142. Brown University, 5 F.3d at 672. 
 143. Id. at 664. The schools in the Ivy Overlap Group expressly agreed to award commonly 
admitted students the same amount of need-based financial aid (no other type of aid was permitted). 
Id. To facilitate the agreement, the schools shared financial information about candidates and 
developed a joint system for computing financial aid awards. Id. at 663. Any failure to follow the 
award system or attempt to cheat by awarding money to students in alternative forms, such as research 
grants, “would result in retaliatory sanctions.” Id. 
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Engineers, dismissed the defendants’ proffered justifications as “social 
welfare concerns” and thus invalidated the Group’s conduct under the 
“quick look.”144  
The Third Circuit reversed and remanded, holding that Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology (“MIT”) had offered sufficient “procompetitive 
and noneconomic”145 justifications for the restraint to look past the “quick 
look” to a full rule of reason analysis.146 First, it explained that MIT’s 
assertions that the Overlap program promoted economic diversity at elite 
institutions and expanded access to the college market for needy students 
could be seen as procompetitive justifications because they enhanced 
consumer choice.147 Then, the court found that MIT’s social welfare 
justification for the Overlap Group—that the Group’s policies allowed the 
member schools to commit to need-blind admissions, thus promoting “the 
social ideal of equality of educational access and opportunity”148—should 
also be fully considered under the rule of reason.149  
Because the parties in Brown University settled without appeal to the 
Supreme Court,150 many considered the legitimacy of noneconomic 
justifications for price restraints by nonprofits an area ripe for Court 
 144. Id. at 664. MIT argued that the actions of the Overlap Group  
 . . . widened the pool of applicants to Overlap institutions by providing needy students with 
the ability to enroll if accepted. This, MIT asserted, increased consumer choice and enhanced 
the quality of the education provided to all students by opening the doors of the most elite 
colleges in the nation to diversely gifted students of varied socio-economic backgrounds.  
Id.  
 145. Id. at 678 (emphasis added); see id.  
 146. Id. at 678. The Third Circuit agreed with the district court that because the Overlap 
Agreement was “a price fixing mechanism impeding the ordinary functioning of the free market, MIT 
[was] obliged to provide justification for the arrangement.” Id. at 674. However, the Third Circuit 
found MIT had provided such justification. Id. at 678.  
 147. Id. at 675.  
 148. Id.  
 149. Id. at 677. In holding that MIT’s social welfare consideration should be analyzed under the 
rule of reason, the Third Circuit distinguished Professional Engineers and Indiana Federation in two 
ways. Id. at 677–78. It reasoned that while the restraints in both prior decisions were enacted to deny 
consumers a choice, the free market would even out the anticompetitive effects. The Overlap Group’s 
restraint on financial aid competition could actually increase consumer choice by enabling more 
consumers (students) to afford tuition at elite institutions. Id. at 677. Finally, it found that the restraints 
imposed by the nonprofit organizations in both Professional Engineers and Indiana Federation were 
based on “economic self-interest.” Id. at 677–78. In contrast, MIT asserted that the Overlap was 
created for the benefit of “needy prospective students who otherwise could not attend the school of 
their choice.” Id. at 678. The court felt that these differences warranted giving MIT a chance to 
legitimize the Overlap Group through a full rule of reason analysis. Id. 
 150. See, e.g., Julie L. Seitz, Consideration of Noneconomic Procompetitive Justifications in the 
MIT Antitrust Case, 44 EMORY L. J. 395, 431 (1995). 
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interpretation.151 However, the Supreme Court’s 1999 decision in 
California Dental shed little light on the confusing state of the law. 
Like the Third Circuit in Brown University, the Court in California 
Dental found that regulations promulgated by a professional association 
(“the CDA”) could not be invalidated using a “quick look” analysis.152 The 
Court first acknowledged that it had created the “quick look,” or truncated 
rule of reason, through its previous decisions.153 It then explained that 
although the truncated rule of reason was a valid mode of analysis,154 the 
case before it failed to “present a situation in which the likelihood of 
anticompetitive effects is comparably obvious,” and thus could not be 
dealt with using the “quick look.”155
The Court’s reluctance to condemn the CDA restrictions without more 
analysis rested in large part on its perception of market failures in the area 
of professional advertising, particularly informational asymmetries.156 The 
Court characterized the market for dental advertising as one containing 
“striking disparities between the information available to the professional 
and the patient.”157 It then reasoned that restrictions on deceptive 
advertising might actually increase competition, because consumers would 
be better informed by the resulting truthful advertising.158
 151. See id. (arguing that after Brown University, the debate over noneconomic justification was 
not settled, and remained open for other circuits interpretations); Srikanth Srinivasen, 46 Stan. L. Rev. 
919, 940 (stating that during the Brown University litigation and after, courts struggled with the issue 
of noneconomic justifications due to “conflicting signals sent by the Supreme Court.”). 
 152. 526 U.S. at 771–73. The California Dential Association regulations prohibited “false or 
misleading” advertising, and required members to make substantial price disclosures in 
advertisements. Id. at 760–61. The regulations effectively banned advertising as to the quality of dental 
services as claims “not susceptible to measurement” and “likely to be false.” Id. at n.1. The FTC felt 
that the regulations restricted truthful advertising, thereby restraining competition in the market for 
dental services. Id. at 762.  
 153. Id. at 770 (characterizing the analysis as one used when “an observer with even a 
rudimentary understanding of economics could conclude that the arrangements in question would have 
an anticompetitive effect on customers and markets.”). The Court cited its decisions in NCAA, 
Professional Engineers, and Indiana Federation. Id. Before California Dental, the Court had not 
officially endorsed what lower courts had been calling the “quick look” approach. See supra note 98 
and accompanying text. 
 154. Id. at 770 (“[Q]uick–look analysis carries the day when the great likelihood of 
anticompetitive effects can be easily ascertained.”). 
 155. Id. at 771. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id.  
 158. Id. at 773 (“The existence of such significant challenges to informed decisionmaking by the 
customer for professional services immediately suggests that advertising restrictions arguably 
protecting patients from misleading or irrelevant advertising call for more than cursory treatment 
. . . .”). For an argument that the Court erred in finding that professional advertising has an 
anticompetitive effect, see David Balto, Some Observations on California Dental Association v. FTC, 
14 ANTITRUST 64, 65 (Fall 1999) (arguing that economic evidence suggests that professional 
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Finally, in remanding the case for further consideration, the Court did 
not direct the lower court to undertake a full rule of reason analysis with a 
detailed market inquiry.159 Thus, the Court remanded for a “fuller” look, 
not necessarily a full one.160  
California Dental has generated an enormous body of commentary.161 
The full effect of the decision on antitrust jurisprudence remains to be 
seen. Part VI will argue that California Dental and Brown University did 
not open the door for consideration of non economic justifications in every 
rule of reason case involving professionals.162 Despite both decisions, a 
less than full rule of reason analysis should suffice to show the 
anticompetitive nature of the NRMP.  
VI. ANALYSIS 
A. A “Quick Look” Analysis Should be Used to Evaluate the Conduct of 
the NRMP 
Brown University and California Dental certainly add difficulty to a 
court’s determination of the type and breadth of evidence to consider in 
advertising of both price and quality tends to decrease the price of services more than in areas where 
such advertising is restricted).  
 159. California Dental, 526 U.S. at 781. Instead, it emphasized that “there is generally no 
categorical line between restraints that give rise to an intuitively obvious inference of anticompetitive 
effect and those that call for more detailed treatment. What is required, rather, is an enquiry meet for 
the case, looking to the circumstances, details, and logic of a restraint.” Id. at 780–81. 
 160. Id. at 781. The court went on to explain that “[t]he object is to see whether the experience of 
the market has been so clear, or necessarily will be, that a confident conclusion about the principal 
tendency of a restriction will follow from a quick (or at least quicker) look, in place of a more sedulous 
one.” Id. For commentary praising a more fluid, sliding-scale antirust analysis, see Thomas A. Piraino, 
Jr., Making Sense of the Rule of Reason: A New Standard for Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 47 VAND. 
L. REV. 1753, 1771 (1994) (“[C]ourts will have to undertake varying degrees of inquiry depending 
upon the type of restraint at issue.”). 
 161. See William J. Kolasky, California Dental Association v. FTC: The New Antitrust 
Empiricism, 14 ANTITRUST 68, 68 (Fall 1999) (praising the Court’s decision as “rejecting overly 
simplistic formulations” and “show[ing] a greater emphasis by the Court on reaching the right result 
. . . .”). Cf. Herbert Hovenkamp, Competitor Collaboration After California Dental Association, 2000 
U. CHI. LEGAL F. 149, 151 (2000) (criticizing California Dental for giving antitrust jurisprudence “a 
juxtaposition of concerns” where the Court “seems excessively sanguine about the threats posed by 
collusive conduct . . . .”); Balto, supra note 158, at 64 (“[T]he suggestion that something like a new 
form of analysis might be presented or articulated [by the Court’s decision] is unconvincing. Rather 
than crafting a template for future rule of reason analysis generally . . . the decision is limited to the 
specific context of self-regulation of advertising by an association of professionals.”); Marina Lao, 
Comment: The Rule of Reason and Horizontal Restraints Involving Professionals, 68 ANTITRUST L. J. 
499, 499–500 (2000) [hereinafter Lao, The Rule of Reason] (viewing the decision as limited, but as 
possibly setting the stage for lower courts to expand the scope of the decision to all restraint cases 
involving professionals). 
 162. See infra notes 163–203 and accompanying text. 
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antitrust cases involving horizontal restraints among professional or 
nonprofit organizations.163 Nevertheless, it is clear that even after these 
decisions, restraints involving professional or nonprofit markets—
including the restraints of the NRMP—should not generally be barred 
from consideration under the “quick look.”164 Both the Third Circuit and 
the Supreme Court expressly acknowledged that the truncated rule of 
reason is appropriate in cases where a plaintiff can show obvious evidence 
of the likelihood of anticompetitive effects of a restraint.165  
Much has been said of the Supreme Court’s requirement in California 
Dental that a plaintiff show “empirical evidence” of anticompetitive 
effects before the “quick look” can be applied in cases involving the 
professions.166 Because such evidence is often impossible to produce, such 
a requirement might prove fatal to plaintiffs in these cases.167 However, 
the Supreme Court’s holding should not be applied so broadly. The Court 
emphasized that greater evidence of anticompetitive effects is needed in 
professional markets characterized by large informational asymmetries.168 
For example, consumers of dental services find it difficult to discern 
whether claims made in professional advertisements are truthful or 
deceptive.169 It recognized that in those situations, regulation by 
 163. See Lao, The Rule of Reason, supra note 161, at 526 (arguing that the California Dental 
“sliding scale” approach to the rule of reason may prove “unworkable in practice . . . since there are no 
rules for determining where a particular restraint should fall on the continuum . . . .”).  
 164. See Hovenkamp, supra note 161, at 176 (stating that the Court in California Dental was not 
intending to create a blanket deference for the learned professions); Balto, supra note 158, at 66 
(arguing that the Court’s decision in California Dental is limited to the context of advertising by 
professionals, and does not extend to other kinds of horizontal restraints). 
 165. See Brown University, 5 F.3d at 678. The Brown University court reversed the district court 
decision because MIT succeeded in overcoming its burden of showing procompetitive effects, not 
because the “quick look” framework was incorrect at the outset. Id. See also California Dental, 526 
U.S. at 769–71. 
 166. California Dental, 526 U.S. at 773–76 (discussing the court of appeals’ failure to require 
“empirical evidence” of anticompetitive effects before shifting the burden of proof to the defendants).  
 167. See Lao, The Rule of Reason, supra note 161, at 511 (stating that requiring empirical 
evidence of anticompetitive effects “could mean that truly anticompetitive acts may escape 
condemnation because the kinds of data demanded by the Court are often difficult to produce.”). Such 
data, which often come in the form of expert economic testimony and market analysis, are also very 
expensive for plaintiffs to produce. Id. 
 168. California Dental, 526 U.S. at 772. 
 169. Id. (“[I]n a market for complex professional services, ‘inherent asymmetry of knowledge 
about the product’ arises because ‘professionals supplying the good are knowledgeable [whereas] 
consumers demanding the good are uninformed.’”) (quoting Carr & Matthewson, The Economics of 
Law Firms: A Study in the Legal Organization of the Firm, 33 J. Law & Econ. 307, 309 (1990)). See 
also Hovenkamp, supra note 161, at 176 (“[T]he Supreme Court was not intending to defer to the 
learned professions as such, but rather to distinguish a class of differentiated markets having unusually 
high information costs. . . .”). 
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professional and nonprofit bodies can “have a net procompetitive 
effect.”170  
This requirement should not be extended to include professional 
markets not burdened by such market failure. Doing so would offer too 
great a protection to nonprofit and professional organizations whose 
regulations do not correct market failure, but burden consumers with 
higher prices and fewer choices.171 By citing with approval to previous 
cases where evidence of anticompetitive effects was inferred from the 
nature of the agreement at hand,172 the Court limited its California Dental 
holding.173
The market for graduate medical education is not characterized by 
informational asymmetries.174 Medical students in the market for residency 
programs—unlike consumers viewing dental advertising—are well 
equipped to evaluate the quality of the education they are buying and to 
make educated cost/quality tradeoffs.175 After four years of medical 
training, students have detailed knowledge of the medical profession and 
what constitutes quality in terms of care and training.176 They are assisted 
in their decisions by numerous detailed publications ranking hospitals and 
programs as well as by medical school career counselors.177 Because 
informational asymmetries do not exist in the market for graduate medical 
education, a challenger to the validity of the NRMP should not need to 
 170. California Dental, 526 U.S. at 771.  
 171. See Lao, The Rule of Reason, supra note 161, at 512 (discussing the varying ways in which 
the rules of professional organizations may limit competition). Cf. Srinivasen, supra note 150, at 957–
58 (concluding that antitrust law still underestimates the positive role of collaboration among 
nonprofits in the market). 
 172. California Dental, 526 U.S. at 770. The Court cited, approvingly, NCAA, Professional 
Engineers, and Indiana Federation as examples of cases in which the “quick look” was appropriate. 
Id. In each of these cases, the Court inferred anticompetitive effects from the questioned agreement 
without requiring empirical evidence. See supra notes 112–55 and accompanying text. 
 173. See Balto, supra note 158, at 66 (arguing that the Court could not have meant to overrule 
cases such as Professional Engineers, given the “deference it pays” to such decisions in its discussion 
of the formation of the “quick look” analysis). 
 174. See supra notes 63–65 (describing informational asymetries) and notes 18–39 (describing the 
market for graduate medical education). 
 175. Medical students “pay” for their residency training in the form of low salaries, long work 
hours, and little vacation time. See supra notes 32–39 and accompanying text. The costs of the training 
to them are a combination of the above factors.  
 176. Fourth-year medical students have completed clinical rotations through all of the major 
medical specialties. 
 177. U.S. News & World Report ranks United States hospitals by department (e.g., geriatrics, 
pediatrics, orthopedics, urology). Usnews.com:health:Best Hospitals 2003, available at 
http://www.usnews.com/usnews/health/hosptl/tophosp.htm. In addition, AAMC maintains an internet 
database for potential residents, containing detailed information about residency programs such as size 
and length of program. AAMC, FREIDA Online Specialty Training Search, supra note 37. 
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present empirical evidence of anticompetitive effects to proceed under the 
“quick look” analysis. 
B. The “Quick Look” Applied to the NRMP 
The “quick look” analysis begins with proof by the plaintiff of 
anticompetitive effects flowing from the challenged restraint.178 The 
challenged restraints in the case of the NRMP are the restrictions on 
resident recruitment by member institutions. These restraints include 
prohibitions on member hospitals offering residencies outside of the 
NRMP, restrictions on bargaining between residents and hospitals before 
the match date, and enforcement of binding contracts between all medical 
students and member hospitals after completion of the match.179 These 
restraints, combined with “a rudimentary understanding” of the economics 
of the graduate medical education market, make it easy to infer significant 
anticompetitive effects. 
By prohibiting member hospitals from offering residencies outside of 
the match, the NRMP controls nearly 80% of the market for residencies,180 
enough to be considered market power under current antitrust law.181 
Students who wish to pursue residency training outside of the match have 
very few options.182 For those students in the match, the situation is not 
much better. The “prices” that residents pay for training (i.e., low salary, 
long hours, little vacation time, minimal insurance benefits) are nearly 
identical at all member institutions.183 In addition, through an extensive 
system of information exchange, hospitals know the prices their 
competitors charge.184 The NRMP forbids hospitals from offering 
incentives to students before the match date.185 Because matching creates a 
 178. See supra notes 98–102 and accompanying text. 
 179. See NRMP: Residency Match, supra note 12, at §§ 5.0, 6.0. 
 180. See supra notes 37–41 and accompanying text. 
 181. See generally HOVENKAMP, ECONOMICS, supra note 42, at 55–59. Market power in antitrust 
law is generally defined as the ability to control price in the relevant market. Id. at 55. Market share is 
often used to determine market power. Id. at 58. An 80% market share is generally seen as enough to 
control prices. Id.  
 182. See supra notes 32–40 and accompanying text. 
 183. See supra notes 37–41 and accompanying text. 
 184. Retrospective salary data for hundreds of residency programs is available through the 
FREIDA database. AAMC, FREIDA Online Specialty Training Search, supra note 37. In addition, the 
Complaint against the NRMP alleges that the AAMC and COTH administered detailed surveys to 
member hospitals requesting prospective salary information as well as data on resident health 
insurance coverage. Complaint, supra note 15, at 24.  
 185. See NRMP: Residency Match, supra note 12, at § 6.0 
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binding contract,186 medical students have no power to bargain with 
different hospitals over the price of their services after the match is 
complete.187  
Member hospitals could compete through non-price means for 
desirable students. However, by virtually eliminating an important form of 
competition, one can infer that the NRMP regulations have the 
anticompetitive effect of raising the prices residents pay for their 
education.188 This inference is further supported by the steep nature of the 
demand curve for medical residencies.189 Medical students must complete 
a residency in order to become practicing physicians, so an increase in the 
cost of the program will not deter many from buying it.190
It is clear that the NRMP regulations support an inference of 
anticompetitive effects.191 Under the “quick look”, the NRMP must offer 
procompetitive justifications for its system in order to survive scrutiny.192 
There are two principal justifications for the NRMP program, one 
economic and one based on social welfare concerns.193  
In terms of economics, the NRMP could argue that the matching 
program drastically reduces the transaction costs of pairing hospitals with 
students. Before the match, hospitals and potential residents found each 
other without the help of a centralized program.194 The process was less 
streamlined and involved more effort from both parties.195 In addition, 
hospitals under the old system would announce their chosen residents 
early in order to beat their competition.196 Many students were forced to 
choose a program before knowing all of the schools to which they had 
been accepted.197 In this way, the universal date that the match provides 
does correct an informational asymmetry. 
 186. Id. at § 5.1 
 187. See, e.g., Miller & Greaney, supra note 137, at 914. Both applicants and hospital programs 
that violate the NRMP rules for participation can be sanctioned. Id. Such programs can be identified as 
“violators” and prohibited from participation in the match for several years. Id. Applicant “violators” 
can have their applications for residency programs withdrawn. Id.  
 188. This inference is similar to the one made by the court in Indiana Federation. 
 189. See generally HOVENKAMP, ECONOMICS, supra note 42, at 6–7. In economics, a demand 
curve is inelastic when an increase in price will produce only a small decrease in demand. Id. Because 
medical students are required to complete a residency before beginning their practice, it would take a 
nearly astronomical price increase to make many decide they should not “buy” a residency. 
 190. See National Board of Medical Examiners, at http://www.nbme.org. 
 191. See supra notes 179–90 and accompanying text. 
 192. See supra notes 98–102 and accompanying text. 
 193. See infra notes 194–200 and accompanying text. 
 194. See supra notes 24–26 and accompanying text. 
 195. See supra notes 24–26 and accompanying text. 
 196. See LUNDMERER, supra note 19, at 90–94. 
 197. Id. 
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The NRMP could also argue that it serves a public health and safety 
function by correcting externalities. As explained above, a medical 
resident does not receive the total value his or her education has to offer.198 
Some of the value is passed to the public who enjoy good quality health 
care from adequately trained professionals.199 The NRMP could argue that 
price competition by residents could drive prices so “low” (higher salaries 
and less time at work) that they fail to take into account the public value of 
resident training. If that happened, the public would suffer from poor 
care.200  
The NRMP may convince a court to accept its justifications for the 
residency matching program. Although the Court rejected a similar health 
and safety rationale in Professional Engineers,201 the Third Circuit’s 
consideration of noneconomic benefits in Brown University may persuade 
a court at least to explore the NRMP’s theory.202 However, even if the 
NRMP succeeds in proving procompetitive justifications for the match, it 
will fail at the next step of analysis: consideration of less restrictive means 
of achieving the proffered benefits.203 The next Part of this Note proposes 
how the NRMP could achieve its goals without such severe 
anticompetitive effects.  
VII. PROPOSAL 
The matching program was originally conceived to correct perceived 
failure in the free market system for residencies.204 However, there are less 
restrictive ways of keeping transaction costs low, avoiding informational 
problems, and eliminating externalities.  
In the free market for residencies, hospitals often created informational 
problems by requiring students to choose programs before they had 
received all possible acceptances.205 This problem could be corrected 
 198. See supra note 72. 
 199. See supra notes 72–77 and accompanying text. 
 200. 435 U.S. at 684. This argument is similar to the argument made by the defendant 
organization in Professional Engineers. Id. It argued that because the bidders for engineering projects 
would not suffer all of the losses from a badly constructed project (the losses would be shared by the 
unfortunate people on a badly built bridge when it came apart), they were likely to undervalue the 
engineers’ services if price competition was allowed. Id. This underevaluation would produce safety 
problems for the public at large. Id. 
 201. Id. at 696. 
 202. See supra notes 141–49 and accompanying text. 
 203. For a description of the third step of analysis under the rule of reason, see supra notes 95–96 
and accompanying text. 
 204. See supra notes 24–27 and accompanying text. 
 205. See supra notes 24–25 and accompanying text.  
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using a simple set of dates. Students would interview for positions with 
hospitals as they currently do. However, instead of listing choices and 
waiting for a computer to match candidates, hospitals would offer medical 
students positions as is customary in a free labor market. If all hospitals 
were required to make their offers by a certain date, and were required to 
hold offers open until a certain later date, the information problem would 
be avoided.206  
Because students would have the power to reject job offers and bargain 
with employers in between the two set dates, hospitals would compete 
vigorously over students, offering better salaries, benefits, or working 
conditions to attract desired candidates. The transaction costs of the new 
system would only be slightly higher than under the current match, since 
hospitals would only have to negotiate with those students to whom they 
had given offers.207
Hospitals would not be forced to offer all of their programs through the 
new system. The NRMP could encourage member hospitals to do so by 
offering benefits such as greater exposure or a chance to join a 
standardized interviewing service. The hospitals not offering programs 
through the date system would proceed the old-fashioned way—through 
résumés and interviewing. Students could choose a residency using either 
system, or could apply for positions through both in order to have more 
options. This minimally regulated system of resident employment would 
retain the benefits of the current program and eliminate anticompetitive 
effects.  
Opponents of a free market system could still argue that in a free 
market, externalities would cause the price of graduate medical education 
to dip below its value, leading to deterioration in the quality of health 
care.208 However, externalities are already addressed by an accreditation 
program that ensures that all residency programs offer a minimally 
acceptable standard of education.209 Such minimum quality standards 
make it impossible for medical students to choose a program of study that 
 206. A resident recruiting program could work similarly to that currently used by law students to 
find employment with law firms and some governmental employers. For a detailed description of the 
law school recruiting program, see National Association for Law Placement, at http://www.nalp.org. 
 207. Hospitals in the current system interview candidates to determine where to rank them on the 
hospitals’ lists, so the costs associated with interviewing would not differ under the new system. 
Personal Communication with Timothy S. Crall, Medical Student (Jan. 11, 2002). 
 208. See Srinivasen, supra note 150, at 931–34 (explaining how nonprofit regulation can allocate 
resources far more efficiently than the free market alone in situations involving market failure). 
 209. See Lao, supra note 61, at 1084 (explaining how accreditation ensures a socially acceptable 
level of quality in legal education, correcting for the externality problem). 
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is dangerous to society. There is no reason that students should not be able 
to make price/quality tradeoffs down to that minimum level.210
Proponents of the NRMP may be correct in asserting that a minimum 
level of regulation is necessary to correct market failures that would 
otherwise plague the market for graduate medical education.211 However, 
the broad, anticompetitive policies of the NRMP are not necessary and 
currently suppress competition in the residency market.212 Thus, the 
NRMP program fails to withstand antitrust scrutiny under a “quick look” 
analysis and should be invalidated in favor of a program which fosters 
competition. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
Before the Supreme Court’s decision in Goldfarb, the policies of the 
NRMP might have been immune from antitrust scrutiny.213 However, 
Goldfarb and its offspring make it clear that nonprofit and professional 
organizations must bring their conduct in line with the requirements of the 
Sherman Act.214 Furthermore, these decisions emphasize that the nonprofit 
status of an organization is relevant only when the structure of the 
marketplace allows nonprofit or professional regulation to promote 
competition.215 The idea that competition itself is unhealthy has not been 
accepted.216 Brown University and California Dental do not alter this 
standard.217 They simply emphasize that in certain situations courts must 
look more closely at nonprofit regulation to determine whether sufficient 
procompetitive effects exist to sanction regulation.218
Under modern antitrust jurisprudence, the actions of the NRMP do not 
offer benefits to competition that could not be attained through less 
restrictive means.219 Therefore, the NRMP should be invalidated and 
 210. See supra notes 63–71 and accompanying text. 
 211. See supra notes 24–27 and accompanying text. 
 212. See supra notes 32–39 and accompanying text. 
 213. See supra note 104 and accompanying text. 
 214. See supra notes 105–36 and accompanying text. 
 215. Id. 
 216. Id. 
 217. See supra notes 137–62 and accompanying text. 
 218. Id. 
 219. See supra notes 104–203 and accompanying text. 
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replaced with a system that promotes competition in the market for 
graduate medical education.  
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